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Although the expression “global imbalances” comprises the word global, most contributions to this
topic have centred on the bilateral imbalances between the US and China, and the Chinese dollar peg as
an underlying factor in particular. Given that the US has the world’s largest current account deficit and
China the largest current account surplus, this bilateral focus is understandable. However, it is helpful to
take a broader perspective when discussing the underlying factors contributing to the Sino-American 
imbalances, especially when thinking about possible solutions to the problem. This brief note discusses
the development of the East Asian trade-production network as one of the underlying reasons for China’s
current account surplus and the role that regional economic cooperation in East Asia, including regional
monetary cooperation, can play in reducing global imbalances.
China’s rapid economic growth has been closely associated with its integration into the world economy.
China’s trade expansion has also been linked to the development of an extensive regional trade-
production-network which has made use of a division of labour across East Asian economies. A regional
production and trade pattern has emerged, in which parts and components are shipped from other
(Southeast) Asian countries to China where they are processed and assembled, before the final goods are
being exported to the market of final demand, often the US and Europe.i China’s bilateral trade surplus
vis-à-vis the US and Europe, respectively, is hence also a consequence of a distinct mode of production
across East Asia, with China absorbing exports from other East Asian countries before they are exported 
after relatively little value has been added. Therefore, parts of China’s exports to the US and Europe can
be characterised as “regional” exports from East Asia, rather than solely Chinese exports. One should also
note that these regional trade production networks are to a large extent owned by European, US, Japanese
and South Korean multinationals, which have outsourced production from their home markets to produce
cheaply in developing East Asia in order to ship the final goods to advanced economies. Foreign direct
investment (FDI) from these firms has significantly contributed to China’s status as the world’s factory
and the resulting current account surpluses. Xing and Detert (2010) use the iPhone—which is assembled
in China—as an example to illustrate how the trade in intermediate products and components has
contributed to a widening of the US trade deficit with China.ii
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Table 1 shows China’s trade balance with the US, the EU and its East Asian neighbours. Besides the 
huge surplus vis-à-vis the US it shows that, on an aggregate level, China has had a trade deficit the East 
Asian region as a whole. 
 
Table 1: Trade balance of China with the US, the EU and East Asian countries (in million USD) 
 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
US 29,785.
6 
28,174.
1 
42,812.
4 
58,694.
3 
80,382.
4 
114,353.
5 
144,571.
9 
163,183.
4 
171,063.
4 
173,483.
9 
EU 8,630.8 5874.8 8,974.1 17,618.
4 
28,667.
0 
57,207.0 79,437.8 107,340.
7 
130,703.
9 
96,013.8 
ASEAN -
4,791.1 
-
4,527.3 
-
7,398.5 
-
16,123.
1 
-
19,872.
2 
-
19,383.4 
-
18,104.8 
-
13,999.7 
-2,915.9 -1,312.2 
ASEAN+
3 
-
16,572.
8 
-
13,110.
7 
-
25,477.
5 
-
53,889.
6 
-
75,161.
4 
-
77,511.2 
-
87,403.7 
-
93,703.2 
-
75,817.7 
-
57,193.5 
Brunei -48.3 -131.0 -220.8 -278.4 -203.2 -154.5 -115.7 -128.8 46.8 -18.1 
Cambodia 104.6 170.9 227.1 268.7 422.6 508.8 662.6 830.2 1,056.4 860.4 
Indonesia -
1,340.1 
-
1,040.9 
-
1,074.1 
-
1,267.6 
-966.8 -61.4 -163.7 238.4 2,827.0 4,656.9 
Japan 133.7 2,267.9 -
5,006.0 
-
14,728.
2 
-
20,857.
8 
-
16,370.8 
-
24,038.5 
-
31,787.0 
-
34,632.0 
-
20,804.0 
Korea -
11,915.
4 
-
10,851.
3 
-
13,073.
0 
-
23,038.
3 
-
34,431.
4 
-
41,757.0 
-
45,260.4 
-
47,916.5 
-
38,269.8 
-
35,077.3 
Lao 28.0 47.0 44.6 87.0 88.2 79.8 119.1 92.4 118.7 42.8 
Malaysia -
2,915.0 
-
2,982.1 
-
4,320.0 
-
7,845.6 
-
10,087.
5 
-9,490.1 -
10,036.5 
-
11,035.5 
-
10,747.6 
-8,547.9 
Myanmar 371.6 363.3 587.9 738.2 731.7 660.5 954.6 1,321.4 1,334.7 1,397.4 
Philippine
s 
-213.0 -323.5 -
1,174.2 
-
3,212.5 
-
4,790.0 
-8,181.4 -
11,938.3 
-
15,623.3 
-
10,419.5 
-4,220.7 
Singapore 701.5 651.7 -85.6 -
1,615.3 
-
1,309.3 
185.5 5,513.4 12,159.4 12,233.1 2,379.3 
Thailand -
2,136.8 
-
2,209.2 
-
2,639.5 
-
4,998.8 
-
5,740.0 
-6,175.2 -8,198.4 -
10,673.0 
-
10,115.5 
-6,054.1 
Vietnam 608.2 795.6 1,035.4 1,722.7 1,778.9 3,090.0 4,982.4 8,691.2 10,796.9 8,173.8 
Source: Own calculations with IMF DTS. 
While the existence of this regional trade-production network within East Asia has contributed to 
China’s current account surplus, further regional economic cooperation and integration can also help 
addressing the problem of China’s external – and hence also global – imbalances. 
First, with prospective slower growth in the advanced economies of Europe and the US, demand for 
Chinese exports is likely to increasingly come from developing East Asia. East Asian economies are 
getting more and more important as destination for Chinese exports. The facilitation of trade between 
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China and ASEAN, Korea and Japan can further enhance business opportunities within the region and 
reduce export dependency of China (and other East Asian economies) on exports to the US and Europe. 
Second, China has increasingly become an investor in other developing East Asian economies, 
following the examples of Japan and Korea. China has already become the largest source of FDI to some 
low-income ASEAN countries such as Cambodia and Lao PDR. iii
Third, the causes for the resurrection of the East Asian dollar standard (or Bretton Woods II) regime – 
the situation where basically all East Asian countries except Japan maintain pegs or soft pegs to the US 
dollar – should not only (or even predominantly) seen in East Asian countries’ attempts to seek export 
competitiveness through an undervalued exchange rate. Indeed, given the magnitude of exports to the US 
(which for most countries in the region are roughly as important as exports to Japan and Europe), pegging 
to the dollar makes limited sense from a trade perspective. However, the dollar pegs make sense when 
taking into account that the joint pegging of East Asian currencies to the dollar as an external anchor has 
provided a significant degree of intra-regional exchange rate stability. Arguably, the trade-production 
networks described above have only been able to develop in an environment of relative intra-regional 
exchange rate stability. Given that intra-regional trade by now accounts for about 60% of total trade of 
East Asian countries (and that East Asian countries are also competing against each other in external 
markets), this intra-regional exchange rate stability is an important regional public good. It is therefore 
time to discuss alternatives to the East Asian dollar standard that will provide the benefit of intra-regional 
exchange rate stability without the problems of the current practice of dollar (soft) pegging. In my view, 
intra-regional monetary and exchange rate cooperation provide a sensible way forward.
 Further Chinese investment in the 
region would not only help position Chinese firms in the regional and international market, it would also 
help alleviate its balance of payments problems by shifting production abroad. Moreover, by creating 
employment in the host countries, Chinese FDI is likely to boost employment and income in these 
economies, contributing to demand for Chinese exports. 
iv
Fourth, global imbalances have to be seen in the light of the role of the US dollar in the global (and 
regional) monetary system. Given the importance of the dollar not only in the denomination of intra-
regional trade but also in the assets and liabilities of East Asian countries’ balance sheets, it is rational for 
these countries to try maintain relative exchange rate stability against the dollar in order to avoid 
destabilising balance sheet effects. Again, regional financial and monetary co-operation that can gradually 
reduce dependency on the dollar is the way forward. Positive examples in this direction are the Chiang 
Mai Initiative Mulilateralisation process and initiatives by ASEAN+3 and EMEAP to foster the 
development of local currency bond markets. 
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i According to the UN Comtrade Database, 70% of Chinese imports from Emerging East and Southeast Asia are parts and 
components. According to the ADB (2010), total final demand outside Asia makes up 71.1% of total Asian exports, of which 23.9% 
go to the US and 22.5% go to the EU. 
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ii According to Xing and Detert, the iPhone contributed USD 1. 9 billion to the US trade deficit with China. In the specific case 
of the iPhone, the most important components come from South Korea, Germany, Japan, and the US. 
iii On Chinese FDI in East Asia see Kubny (2011). 
iv See Volz (2010) for an analysis of the prospects for regional monetary cooperation in East Asia. 
